What is the difference between disarmament and nonproliferation

It is therefore also necessary to prevent the re-emergence and re-use of the weapons categories concerned resurgence of use of chemical weapons in recent years in Syria, for example, despite their total prohibition in the Chemical Weapons Convention. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a nuclear weapons State in the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT , France has special responsibilities to protect and bolster international peace and security.

Its action in the fields of countering proliferation, arms control and disarmament takes into account this dual responsibility. It supports the international organizations responsible for implementing international verification systems, and participates in confidence-building and security measures designed to ensure stability and transparency within the international community.

Fast forward to , and it may surprise readers that big, foundational questions present at the dawn of the nuclear era remain today — from the military utility of nuclear weapons, to requirements for deterrence, to the role of nuclear negotiations. Some see slow progress on disarmament as an indication of bad faith whereas others regard it as an unavoidable product of major-power relations.

Some anticipate that entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and other such agreements will bear on the decision of states to pursue nuclear weapons or tighten nonproliferation rules, whereas others are less sure. Still others worry about backsliding on nonproliferation with the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty , whereas others are less concerned. This article argues that although the evidence linking disarmament steps that is, nuclear arms control to specific nonproliferation outcomes is thin, decoupling the two as a matter of policy or strategy would be counterproductive.

Because neither nuclear deterrence alone nor nuclear disarmament alone can guarantee international stability, the wider effort to address nuclear-weapon risks requires updated strategies that hold each strand in balance.

How well the United States and others rise to this challenge may be a defining strategic issue of the next decade. The historical record is inconclusive as to whether disarmament contributes to nonproliferation. On one side of the ledger, Iran and North Korea , the two most significant proliferation cases of the last two decades, accelerated their covert nuclear and missile programs at a time when the United States and Russia, the two largest holders of nuclear weapons, were reducing their strategic nuclear stockpiles to levels not seen since the early years of the Cold War.

This was also a period in which the A. Khan network was peddling black-market nuclear technology and India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear-weapon tests in May , ending any realistic prospect of reversing those programs for the foreseeable future. There was more good news. In , South Africa dismantled nuclear weapons it had developed in secret and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state, becoming the only nation in history to build and give up the atomic bomb.

In the same year, Brazil and Argentina gave up their presumed nuclear-weapon programs and joined the treaty following the transition of each from military to civilian rule.

And by , Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan came into the treaty after returning large stocks of nuclear weapons each inherited after the Soviet collapse. One problem with making judgments about proliferation choices is small sample size. Because only a handful of states have developed nuclear weapons, more is understood about the reasons states have not done so.

Nine states are known or thought to have nuclear weapons today, the same number as 30 years ago. South Africa dropped out of the club, and North Korea opted in. This is a remarkable, given predictions in the s that as many as 20 to 25 states could soon have nuclear weapons. A range of factors explain this, including widespread support for a nonproliferation norm and a set of rules to uphold it, major-power cooperation on nonproliferation, and the role played by U.

Certain occasions called for U. For the handful of known proliferation cases, security considerations best explain state behavior. India, Pakistan , and Israel fought multiple wars against regional adversaries and likely view nuclear weapons as necessary for national survival.

India, in addition, sought nuclear weapons to counterbalance Chinese power and keep Pakistan in check. And North Korea presumably sees nuclear weapons as providing protection from coercion or military attack.

While Iran seems to have deferred a decision on whether to pursue nuclear weapons, its record of nonproliferation violations, paired with its regional aspirations, suggests security motivations are very much in play.

Dynastic survival North Korea , political legitimacy Iran, Pakistan , and national or scientific prestige India, Iran also factor in these proliferation cases, but none can be explained in the absence of a security-based rationale or by failures to advance nuclear arms control or other disarmament-related actions.

Just as security drove American and Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons in the s, security considerations brought them to cooperate on nonproliferation two decades later. The benefits of barring German or Japanese nuclear armament were hardly lost on the Soviet leadership, bringing the superpowers together in multilateral talks on a nonproliferation pact just several years removed from the Cuban Missile Crisis. That cooperation survived the ups and downs of the Cold War, but may be harder to hold together now given the discord in U.

Supporters of arms control are generally bullish on linkage, citing the potential to generate political support for nonproliferation reforms or coercive measures to confront proliferators. Arms control skeptics are far more bearish, dismissing these gains as wishful thinking or an unwise constraint on the very type of military power required to deter would-be proliferators.

Each reveals sources of friction, which if left unattended risk eroding the twin pillars of international nuclear policy: that there be no nuclear wars and that no additional states acquire nuclear weapons.

Where one stands on arms control linkage largely tracks with assumptions made about the legal relationship of nonproliferation and disarmament under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

One perspective treats these obligations as equivalent, meaning parties are not free to insist on total implementation of one nonproliferation while deferring work on the other disarmament. Other than calling for negotiations to end the arms race, the treaty provides no direction on how, when, with what verification or enforcement, and under what political conditions nuclear disarmament is to be achieved. Adding to the legal turbulence, Article VI marks out two pathways to nuclear disarmament — a stand-alone agreement or as part of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Neither is remotely attainable at this point in history the latter even less so , but partial steps along the way are — evidenced by the massive cuts to nuclear forces have been achieved over the last plus years. Those prioritizing disarmament welcome such steps, but generally regard them skeptically as partial, reversible, or lacking in urgency or imagination.

Unfortunately, such legal quarrels reveal little about the effect of disarmament on nonproliferation. It is the case that upswings or downturns in nuclear arms control tend to track with successful or failed Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences success defined as the parties reaching consensus on a final document.

Regrettably, it is easier to trace a negative than a positive correlation of arms control to nonproliferation. This involves non-nuclear-weapon states withholding support for nonproliferation actions as leverage to secure commitments on disarmament. Opposition takes the form of a grievance: that non-nuclear-weapon states should not be asked to take on added nonproliferation obligations until they see a deeper commitment to disarmament.

Is nuclear deterrence essential to prevent major-power conflict, or does it pose unacceptable risks to the rest of the world? Is slow progress on disarmament a reflection of the security environment or a failure of political will and imagination? Has proliferation been held in check because of the force of a rules-based nonproliferation system or for other reasons?

Three dominant schools of international relations theory shed some light on why answers given to these questions are so vastly different. Of the 80 or so ban treaty signatories, none possesses nuclear weapons or sits under the U. This seems unlikely to change for the foreseeable future, meaning that the ban treaty will not result in nuclear reductions or alter nuclear deterrence policies. Most States see nuclear weapons as a major source of insecurity for their populations and for future generations.

Irrespective of their view of the TPNW, all NPT States Parties should reaffirm the humanitarian rationale that motivated the development of the NPT in the first place, and urgently implement long-standing risk reduction commitments. The ICRC firmly believes that disarmament and non-proliferation are not just tools to maintain international peace and security.

They are also critical means to mitigate the impact of armed conflict when it occurs. This is also the aim of IHL. Respecting and ensuring respect for IHL in armed conflict, including its rules prohibiting or limiting the use of certain weapons, is a fundamental responsibility of States.

The NPT contains a vision of security without nuclear weapons, one that is more viable and humane, and which States Parties have long promised to achieve. By entering this website, you consent to the use of technologies, such as cookies and analytics, to customise content, advertising and provide social media features.

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